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A WELL-PLEAD COMPLAINT-THE KEY TO RECOVERY
OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES FOR DELAY IN ADMIRALTY
CHUCK TALLEY
I. INTRODUCTION
The scenario is simple. Your six-hundred foot freighter has been
in port being loaded with goods destined for Central and South
America; her fuel tanks are full; the crew and supplies are on
board; the engines start as helper tugs position themselves for the
vessel's departure; and a crew of seventy-three seamen stand by to
assist in the maneuver. Word comes across the freighter's VHF ra-
dio that a five-hundred foot tanker has negligently collided with
the bridge which spans the entrance to the port. As a result, the
Coast Guard has closed the channel leading from the port and esti-
mates that it will be at least three weeks before it is reopened.
Have you suffered any damage? Of course! Your vessel must re-
main in port for at least three weeks when it should be on the high
seas. You incur additional expenses as a result of the delay, such as
salary and supplies for an idle crew and wharfage fees. Since you
have been injured, you can surely sue the negligent party and col-
lect for all of these damages, right? Not necessarily.
Two divergent groups of cases address the issue of the recovery
of damages due to delay:' one group disallowing delay damages
and the other allowing them. No judicial opinion has yet reconciled
these views so as to provide a definitive answer to the issue of de-
lay damages.
This comment will review these two groups of cases, highlighting
the various courts, causes of action, plaintiffs, manners of pleading
damages, and other factors that might aid in determining why
some actions for delay damages succeed while others do not. These
factors will then be summarized to aid an attorney in making a
more accurate prediction of the outcome of a delay damages claim.
II. CASES SUPPORTING THE DENIAL OF RECOVERY
The Supreme Court decision of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
1. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Dick Meyers
Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979); Micmar Motorship Corp. v. Cabaneli Naviera, S.A., 477 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. La. 1979);
Complaint of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 449 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ohio 1977); In re China Union
Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Piscataqua Nay. Co. v. New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co., 89 F. 362 (D. Mass. 1898), modified, 108 F. 92 (1st Cir. 1901).
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v. Flint2 is the leading case denying recovery of delay damages. In
Robins, the time charterer of a vessel sought to recover damages
resulting from a delay in the return of the vessel from the dry
dock.' In drydocking the vessel, the employees of Robins Dry Dock
had damaged the propeller and the replacement of the part caused
the delay.4 The time charterer argued that as the intended benefi-
ciary of the contract between the owner and Robins, it should re-
cover the profits it could have earned had the vessel been ready on
time.5
In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court held that the
third party charterers could not recover for the negligent interfer-
ence with the charter agreement on tort or breach of contract prin-
ciples.' The Court noted, however, that where a primary party
knows of the contract with the third party and adjusts its conduct
so as to intentionally interfere with that contract, the third party
then has a cause of action.7 The Court further noted that without
this intent:
[A]s a general rule, .... a tort to the person or property of one
man does not make the tort-feasor liable to another merely be-
cause the injured person was under a contract with that other,
unknown to the doer of the wrong .... The law does not spread
its protection so far.8
An underlying factor which appears to have influenced the
Court's decision was the charterer's attempt to recover pure eco-
nomic loss without an accompanying proprietary loss.9 This at-
tempted recovery contradicts the theory that a party cannot re-
cover economic losses unless proprietary damage has also been
2. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
3. Id. at 307. In a time charter arrangement, the owner of the vessel remains in control
of and responsible for the vessel while the charterer directs what, where, and how goods are
to be loaded and delivered. The time charter should be compared with the demise or bare-
boat charter which shifts possession and control of the vessel to the charterer. G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 230, 239 (2d ed. 1975). The latter arrangement would
appear to give the charterer more of a property interest in the vessel. See 275 U.S. at 308.
The importance of this distinction will arise later. See notes 27, 37 infra, and accompanying
text. See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. M/V Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.
1979).
4. 275 U.S. at 307.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 307-09.
7.. Id. at 308-09.
8. Id. at 309 (citation omitted).
9. Id. at 308-09.
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sustained.1" Some of the rationales often given for the existence of
this rule are: (1) the defendant would be subject to claims based
upon remote, speculative, and unforseeable injuries, and therefore,
the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff to guard against these
injuries; (2) the doctrine of proximate cause prevents a recovery of
these damages;1" and (3) the allowance of recovery would make the
defendant liable for an excessive or unduly oppressive amount of
damages."2 This general requirement of proprietary damages has
been applied to a variety of situations, including the destruction of
a bridge, the severing of a power line to a printing business, and
the injury of a person to whom a third person owed life-care medi-
cal services.'3
Although the importance of some factors can only be implied
from the Robins decision, the holding by the Supreme Court is
clear; third parties cannot recover damages, especially lost profits,
due to the negligent interference with a contract. 4
The next significant decision disallowing recovery of delay dam-
ages is In re Kinsman Transit Co., 5 in which a vessel broke loose
from its moorings, drifted down Buffalo River, collided with an-
other vessel, and continued downriver until both vessels crashed
into the Michigan Avenue Bridge. The debris from the accident
caused the river to dam, thereby obstructing traffic for approxi-
mately two months." As a consequence of the collision, Cargill
Inc., was unable to transport its grain. The company incurred ad-
ditional expenses when it was forced to buy substitute grain at a
higher price while storing the untransported wheat.'7 Additionally,
Cargo Carriers, Inc., was temporarily prevented from unloading its
cargo in the customary manner and sought to recover the expenses
10. See James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. Rav. 43, 43 (1972). This theory may explain in part the
charterer's efforts to connect itself with the damage caused to the vessel's propeller. .275
U.S. at 308.
11. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974). For specific cases
involving these theories see id. at 563 notes 4, 5 & 6.
12. See James, supra note 10, at 48; Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Ex-
pectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REv. 664, 674 (1964).
13. See 501 F.2d at 563-64. See also Note, supra note 12, at 665.
14. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 938-42 (4th ed. 1971).
15. 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. Id. at 822. The first case to adjudicate the negligence issues was In re Kinsman
Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (Kinsman I), which held that if any harm to the
plaintiff was forseeable, the defendant was also liable for the unforseeable consequences to
him. The subsequent Kinsman decision which determined the issue of damages is known as
Kinsman I, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
17. 388 F.2d at 823, 823 n.3.
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it incurred as a result of having to rent special equipment. 8
The lower court refused to allow these claims since they involved
the negligent interference with contractual relations. A recovery in
tort on this basis was barred by Robins in the absence of either
intentional interference or knowledge of the contract." The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, chose not to rely on Robins, finding there
was no satisfactory reason to differentiate between contract rights
and other legally protected interests. The court resorted to more
familiar "tort terrain," noting that the claims of Cargill and Cargo
Carriers were alleged to have resulted from the ship owner's negli-
gence.'0 Concluding that the connection between the defendants'
negligence and the claimants' damages was too tenuous and re-
mote, the appellate court refused to permit recovery.2" Thus, as a
result of Kinsman, even if a claim for delay damages is not dis-
missed as involving the negligent interference with contract, it may
still be denied under tort theory if the damages appear too tenuous
or remote."
Regardless of the opinion in Kinsman, the Robins decision has
generally been followed by the courts. In In re S. C. Loveland
Co.," the owner of a barge which sank while docked at a wharf was
seeking exoneration from or limitation of his liability in a claim by
a shipper for lost earnings. The loss to the shipper was caused by
his inability to use the wharf to unload deliveries of coke pursuant
to contracts entered into before the accident.'4 Relying partially on
Robins, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania determined that the shipper's claim was based on
the negligent interference with a contract and denied recovery."5
A similar result was reached by the Southern District Court of
18. Id. at 823.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 823-24.
21. Id. at 825. Professor Prosser has attempted to clarify the Kinsman cases in his horn-
book on torts. Prosser notes that the "scope of the foreseeable risk" is becoming the most
prominent test of proximate cause, due primarily to its vagueness. As a result there is little
predictability as to what is or is not foreseeable. Most decisions are solely a result of the
trier of facts' intuition as to what the phrase "natural and probable consequences" actually
entails. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 43, at 267-70. See also Gregory, Proximate Cause
in Negligence-A Retreat from "Rationalization," 6 U. CHI. L. REv. 36, 50 (1938).
22. This analysis appears to open a loophole. If counsel can present his or her complaint
in a pure tort context without reference to interference with contractual rights, the effect of
Robins might be avoided.
23. 170 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
24. Id. at 787-88.
25. Id. at 792.
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New York in Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V
Marathonian. In this case, a time charterer of a vessel involved
in a collision with another ship, sued the negligent party for its
damages, including loss of use of the chartered vessel. The court
applied the Robins rationale and concluded that "[a] time char-
terer (who is without any property right in the vessel) cannot re-
cover pecuniary losses sustained as the result of a third-party's
negligent interference with the performance of the contract be-
tween the charterer and the vessel's owner. "27
Several cases from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals have fol-
lowed the theory that delay damages should not be awarded. The
first was Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Marshland
Dredging Co. 28 In Kaiser, the recipients of gas from a pipeline,
owned and operated by the Sugar Bowl Gas Company, brought
suit against a barge owner whose employees dropped a heavy
anchor on the pipeline, causing service to be interrupted, and
thereby forcing Kaiser to shut down its production operations.
Both the trial court and the Fifth Circuit relied on Robins to con-
clude that, since the employees of Marshland did not intentionally
interfere with Kaiser's contract rights and no evidence existed that
those working for Marshland had any knowledge of the contract
between Kaiser and Sugar Bowl Gas, this action was merely for the
negligent interference with contract rights and thus lacked merit.29
The Fifth Circuit delivered a similar opinion in Dick Meyers
Towing Service, Inc. v. United States,30 in which a tugboat opera-
tor sued the United States and a private construction company for
profits it could have made if a lock had not failed, thereby blocking
river traffic for five months.8 1 In an effort to avoid the "time char-
ter-third party-negligent interference with contract" language from
Robins and Kaiser, the plaintiff argued that the defendants in
26. 392 F. Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 975 (1976).
27. Id. at 910 (footnote omitted). One might consider whether by depriving the time
charterer of this action, the negligent party has been exonerated from all liability for loss of
use of the vessel. This depends on whether the charterer is relieved of its contract with the
vessel owner, allowing the owner to maintain such an action. But if the charterer is bound to
the contract, or if the vessel is unique and a replacement is not available, the negligent
party seems to have come upon a windfall. Once again the reader should question the im-
portance of time charterer status and whether a property right is really essential to maintain
a cause of action. See James, supra note 10, at 55-57.
28. 455 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972).
29. Id. at 958.
30. 577 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
31. 577 F.2d at 1024.
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Dick Meyers were under the ordinary rules of tort liability and
owed a duty directly to those dependent upon the continued oper-
ation of the locks and dams on the river. Furthermore, the plaintiff
contended that his position was more analogous to the vessel own-
er in Robins and the pipeline owner in Kaiser, than to the plain-
tiffs in those cases, because he was not merely "incidently injured"
by the defendants' conduct.3 '
Citing Robins and Kaiser as authority, the court stated that,
"[tihe law has traditionally been reluctant to recognize claims
based solely on harm to the interest in contractual relations or
business expectancy. The critical factor is the character of the in-
terest harmed and not the number of parties involved."33 Although
the Fifth Circuit noted that the wisdom underlying the rule of neg-
ligent interference with contracts was open to debate, the court
concluded that Robins still controlled and that the panel of judges
deciding the case was in no position to overturn the well-settled
rule of that decision."
In the last of the cases from the Fifth Circuit, Louisville &
Nashville Railroad v. M/V Bayou Lacombe,3 5 a railroad company
was denied recovery for the loss of use of a bridge damaged by a
vessel." The court stated that recovery might have been possible
under Robins if the time-charterer had been a demise-charterer
with a property right in the vessel. The court concluded, however,
that the plaintiff suffered "the loss of an economic expectancy and
not a proprietary loss."'87 Thus, Robins appears to control in the
Fifth Circuit if a plaintiff's claim even resembles an action for the
negligent interference with a contract, irrespective of the actual
form of the pleading.
Other courts have also followed the precedent established by the
Supreme Court and have denied recovery for economic losses. The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland in Gen-
32. Id. at 1025.
33. Id. The court seems to be of the opinion that past concerns as to time charterers and
third parties are no longer of any importance. This would seem to imply that a vessel owner,
whose ship was involved in a collision due to the negligence of the other vessel, could not
recover for lost profits. This conclusion, however, is clearly against the established weight of
authority. See, e.g., The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110 (1897); Delta Marine Drilling Co. v. M/V
Baroid Ranger, 454 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1972); Barger v. Hanson, 426 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1970);
Oil Transport Co. v. The Lunga Point, 182 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. La. 1959).
34. 577 F.2d at 1025.
35. 597 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979).
36. Id. at 470, 472.
37. Id. at 473-74. In this discussion the court noted that demise charterers may have
sufficient proprietary interests in vessels to give them standing to sue for loss of use. Id.
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eral Foods Corp. v. United States,3 8 used the principles of both
Robins and Kinsman to conclude that the user of a bridge could
not sue for loss of use of that bridge when it was damaged by a
vessel. The court found that the plaintiff had not suffered a com-
pensable property loss and furthermore, that its damages were re-
mote and tenuous.3 '
The plaintiffs in General Foods argued that, unlike Robins,
there was no contract with the defendant, that they were forsee-
able plaintiffs, and that there was some "special relationship" be-
tween the parties that should allow recovery.'0 The court rejected
these arguments stating first that Robins implied that in the ab-
sence of a contract, the loss would be placed under the general rule
against recovery of damages and, therefore, the nonproprietory loss
was not compensable.4 1 Furthermore, although forseeability is one
factor in assessing liability, the court was concerned that the liabil-
ity for negligence should be limited. In this instance the connection
was too remote and tenuous. ' Finally, the "special relationship"
that was alleged by the plaintiff with the defendant was not the
type that was traditionally recognized by the courts to justify re-
covery for pure economic loss.'3
In Complaint of Bethlehem Steel Corp.," the district court in
Ohio, basing its opinion on Canadian law, dismissed twenty-two
separate claims for economic loss due to delay,' which arose when
a vessel struck a bridge, blocking traffic for several days.'6
Thus, the general rule derived from these cases which follow the
Robins rationale is that one cannot recover for economic losses
caused by a delay unless there is also a direct, compensable, pro-
prietary loss.
38. 448 F. Supp. 111 (D. Md. 1978).
39. Id. at 112-15. The court then proceeded to explain that the right to recover pure
economic loss in negligence had been allowed in select instances, but that this was not such
an instance. Id. at 115. Finally, the court cited In re Lyra Shipping Co., 360 F. Supp. 1188
(E.D. La. 1973), and In re China Union Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. Tex. 1967), two
key cases allowing recovery of economic losses due to delay and noted that they were not
indicative of the great weight of authority. 448 F. Supp. at 116.
40. 448 F. Supp. at 114-15.
41. Id. at 114.
42. Id. at 114-15.
43. Id. at 115.
44. 449 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
45. Id. at 689.
46. Id. at 682. The impact of allowing the cause of action requested by the claimants can
clearly be seen here as the several days of delay produced claims totaling approximately two
million dollars. Id. at 683-84.
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III. CASES SUPPORTING THE RECOVERY OF DELAY DAMAGES
The recovery of economic losses due to a delay has been allowed
by some courts in the United States. The emergence of this second
line of cases is particularly noteworthy when it occurs within cir-
cuits which have traditionally dismissed complaints of this type.
Three district court decisions from the Fifth Circuit are evidence
of the trend towards allowing awards for delay damages.
In re China Union Lines, Ltd.,47 was the first of the district
court decisions to support the recovery of these damages. In China
Union Lines, the petitioner was sued for delay damages caused
when petitioner's vessel, the Union Reliance, negligently collided
with another vessel in the Houston Ship Channel and blocked
marine traffic for two days.'6 While the claimants presented a
novel argument of public nuisance, the court determined this argu-
ment to be unnecessary. Instead, the court determined that the
case merely involved the maritime tort of negligence, thus making
the petitioner liable for all damages proximately caused by its neg-
ligence. The court stated:
Certainly, the [Union Reliance] owed a duty to all those using
or seeking to use the ship channel not to obstruct their passage.
Further, it was clearly foreseeable that a negligent collision in the
narrow channel would effectively delay all traffic for at least some
substantial period of time. When the negligence of the Union Re-
liance caused the collision, the duty was breached and the fore-
seeable was made fact. Consequently, such damages as these
claimants may prove were incurred because denied normal access
to the channel are ... recoverable.49
Without any reference to Robins, the court ordered the parties to
reach an agreement as to the amount of economic damages to be
paid.50
Two other cases within the Fifth Circuit, In re Lyra Shipping
Co.6 1 and Micmar Motorship Corp. v. Cabaneli Naviera, S.A., 2
also allowed the recovery of economic losses.
In Lyra, the petitioner's vessel was involved in a collision which
47. 285 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
48. Id. at 426-27.
49. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. 360 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. La. 1973).
52. 477 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. La. 1979), vacated, 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980) (vacated and
remanded without opinion).
RECOVERY IN ADMIRALTY
obstructed the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal Locks. Two of the
claimants, Tex-Barge, Inc., and Marine Tow, Inc., were traversing
the canal when the collision occurred. As a result, both claimants
were forced to reroute their trip and subsequently sued for dam-
ages "consisting of delay and detention of the claimants' vessel
. . ., loss of profits, additional fuel and other supplies consumed,
additional crew hire paid, and other substantial expenses necessa-
rily incurred.""3
The defendant relied on Robins, Kaiser, and Kinsman in an ef-
fort to prove that a third party could not recover damages for
losses which were both tenuous and attributable to a tort commit-
ted on another.8 ' The claimants, in an attempt to distinguish these
cases, maintained that they owned the revenue-producing prop-
erty, unlike the time-charterer in Robins. The claimants did admit
that had their customers brought suit for damages, Robins would
indeed have applied, but since this was not the case, the owners of
the vessel contended that they were entitled to recover.85
The second argument advanced by the claimants was that
through the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, Con-
gress had placed an affirmative duty on all persons to keep naviga-
ble waterways in the United States free from obstructions." The
regulation prohibits the "creation of any obstruction not affirma-
tively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of
the waters of the United States, ' 7 and makes it unlawful "to vol-
untarily or carelessly sink, or permit or cause to be sunk, vessels or
other craft in navigable channels."8 8 While not technically provid-
ing a theory of recovery, the federal navigation statute implies a
civil liability. 9 This statutory liability has been extended to cases
involving recovery of economic losses and in maritime actions
53. 360 F. Supp. at 1189.
54. Id. at 1190.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1190-91. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-15 (1976). More important, yet not mentioned by the
court in Lyra, is § 409 which states that, "It shall not be lawful to . . .voluntarily or care-
lessly sink, or permit or cause to be sunk, vessels or other craft in navigable channels."
Statutes such as these have been used in cases to establish civil liability. See, e.g., Lauritzen
v. Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist., 259 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Va. 1966), modified,
404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968). Gulf Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Becker County Sand & Gravel
Co., 122 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.N.C. 1954); Maier v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 62 F.
Supp. 161, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946).
57. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
58. Id. at § 409.
59. Lauritzen, 259 F. Supp. at 638.
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where injured private parties are seeking damages. 60
The court in Lyra agreed with the claimants that both the "stat-
utory 'nuisance' doctrine and ordinary maritime tort law" provided
a basis for recovery. The court found that a violation of the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act made the negligent party liable to
the United States and private parties.61 The claimants stated that
under the statutory theory of public nuisance, they were "not
merely third parties damaged incidentally by harms inflicted on
others, but instead [were] persons directly aggrieved and possess-
ing a cause of action in their own right."6" The court, after a dis-
cussion of the compatibility of China Union Lines with the instant
case and the public nuisance concepts therein, concluded that Tex-
Barge, Inc., and Marine Tow, Inc., could statutorily recover the ad-
ditional expenses incurred by the delay." Furthermore, the court
accepted the contention of the vessel owners that traditional mari-
time tort principles would also allow recovery. The court recog-
nized, however, that actions for the impairment of contracts with
more remote parties would still not be permitted under Robins.64
In Micmar Motorship Corp. v. Cabaneli Naviera, S.A.,6" the
owner of a merchant vessel sued a tanker and her owner for dam-
ages due to a delay caused by the tanker's obstruction of the pas-
60. See, e.g., In re Lyra Shipping Co., 360 F. Supp. 1188, 1190-91 (E.D. La. 1973); Lau-
ritzen v. Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist., 259 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Va. 1966),
modified, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968); Gulf Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Becker Sand & Gravel
Co., 122 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.N.C. 1954); Maier v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol Co., 62 F.
Supp. 161, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946).
61. 360 F. Supp. at 1190-91. Instrumental in the court's decision was the case of Laurit-
zen v. Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist., 259 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1966), modified,
404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968), which allowed a private party to sue the state when a vessel
struck an underwater obstruction which the defendant had allegedly permitted to remain in
a navigable channel in violation of the Act.
62. 360 F. Supp. at 1191.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1191, 1192. While the claimants had sought damages for such items as delay,
detention and lost profits, the court never explicitly denied recovery of these damages. The
court did conclude, however, that upon proper proof, claimants could recover such addi-
tional expenses as "extra fuel costs, wages, and the like." Id. at 1191. Since the court never
stated which damages were finally recovered by the claimants, the reader should be curious
as to what happened to the claimants' request of delay damages, detention damages, and
lost profits, especially since the court later stated that another claimant sought the same
type of damages as the first claimants and did not attempt to recover for the impairment of
contractual obligations. Id. at 1192. Could it be that the first claimants phrased their dam-
ages in such a way so as not to appear to involve any negligent interference with contracts?
65. 477 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. La. 1979), vacated, 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980) (vacated and
remanded without opinion).
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sage of the plaintiff's vessel."" The obstruction was caused when
the tanker, while heading up the Mississippi River, suffered a com-
plete loss of power and came to rest in front of the plaintiff's
anchored vessel. The plaintiff's merchant vessel was unable to
move into a nearby unloading berth when it became available be-
cause those onboard plaintiff's vessel believed the anchor line of
the tanker had crossed those of the merchant vessel. 7
Relying on Lyra and China Union Lines, the court noted that
"under some circumstances a vessel creating an obstruction will be
held liable not because another vessel collided with it, but because
the other vessel could not pass and suffered damages as a result.""
In this case, the plaintiff was seeking only damages due to the de-
lay plus some associated damages. The court agreed that a "fore-
seeable consequence" of negligence which causes a power failure
would be the obstruction of another ship's passage.69 Nevertheless,
the court denied recovery, holding that the plaintiff had failed to
establish that those in charge of the vessel reasonably considered it
to be obstructed by defendant's vessel. 0
Courts in other circuits have also allowed the recovery of dam-
ages due to delay, as in the 1898 case of Piscataqua Navigation Co.
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.7 1 In Piscataqua, the defendant rail-
road failed to comply with its statutory duty to operate its draw-
bridge in a manner so as to accommodate vessels passing through
the channel, and as a result, the plaintiffs could not traverse the
channel.72 The plaintiffs argued that this situation created a public
nuisance since the public right to navigate had been obstructed.7
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
accepted this theory and concluded that the plaintiffs were enti-
tled to recover damages:74
[Iln the present case, the plaintiffs were in the actual use of the
way, and were subjected to actual obstruction, and to actual loss
additional to that which, by presumption of law, attaches to each
66. Id. at 48.
67. Id. at 47-48.
68. Id. at 48.
69. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 51.
71. 89 F. 362 (D. Mass. 1898), modified, 108 F. 92 (1st Cir. 1901). This case was decided
before Robins and it could be distinguished on that factor alone. Yet, this case is different in
that the cause of action is based solely on the theory of public nuisance. 89 F. at 362-63.
72. Id. at 362.
73. Id. at 363.
74. Id. at 365.
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member of the public. This actual loss, proved as a matter of fact,
is the gist of the private action.75
Thus, as a result of the Piscataqua and Lyra decisions, public nui-
sance appears to be a sound theory on which to base a claim for
delay damages.
Negligence principles have also served as a basis for recovery in
some courts. In The Jamaica7  a vessel sank while moored to a
pier, thereby preventing another vessel from leaving its slip during
the two months it took to remove the ship." The court referred to
a duty imposed on navigators to "prevent mischief to others" and
concluded that, based on the common law principles of negligence,
the defendants were liable to the plaintiffs for all provable dam-
ages directly attributable to the sinking of The Jamaica.7 8
Finally, in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen7 the plaintiffs sued for the
loss of a business expectancy (lost profits) resulting from an oil
spill caused by defendant's negligence.80 The Ninth Circuit held
that an oil company owes a duty to commercial fisherman not to
diminish the aquatic life by polluting the water. The fishermen
were allowed to recover for a purely economic loss because of the
breach of this duty, and the resulting lost profits.8
Although the Oppen decision is contrary to the rule expressed in
Robins, an exception to the Robins rule has emerged which is pre-
mised on the existence of a special relationship between the par-
ties.82 Thus, recovery for economic losses has been allowed in cases
where a telegraph company failed to deliver a message that would
have resulted in the plaintiff obtaining a lucrative contract; where
a volunteer failed to continue performance on his gratuitous prom-
ise to obtain insurance for the plaintiff; where an insurance com-
75. Id. at 363.
76. 51 F.2d 858 (W.D.N.Y. 1931).
77. Id. at 859.
78. Id. at 860, 861.
79. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
80. Id. at 559-60.
81. Id. at 570-71. While clearly limiting its decision to the specific facts of the case, the
court noted that recovery of purely economic losses are usually allowed only in instances
where a special relationship exists between the parties. Id. at 565; see W. PROSSER, supra
note 14, § 130, at 952.
In another action, Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973), which involved
the same oil spill as Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, the Ninth Circuit noted that the doctrine of
public nuisance could be used under California law to recover for an interference with the
public's right of navigation if the plaintiff has suffered special injury. Plaintiffs were not
allowed to recover in the 1973 case as they failed to prove special damages. Id. at 259-60.
82. See W. PRossEa, supra note 14, § 129, at 935-36; § 130, at 952
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pany delayed in acting upon an insurance application; and where a
lawyer negligently prepared a will to the detriment of the intended
beneficiaries. 83 Furthermore, courts have extended this exception
to allow recovery from defendants involved in various professions,
businesses, and trades where the alleged economic losses were the
result of the negligent performance of tasks associated with the de-
fendant's callings."
The holding in Oppen seems to indicate that the Ninth Circuit
found that a special relationship existed between the plaintiff
fishermen and the defendant oil company since, "[b]oth ... con-
duct their business operations away from land and in, on and
under the sea[;] [b]oth must carry on their commercial enterprises
in a reasonably prudent manner[;] [and] [n]either should be per-
mitted negligently to inflict commercial injury on the other."86 The
court recognized that the right of a fisherman to recover his por-
tion of a catch was a "special right" similar to that of an em-
ployer's right to sue for the loss of services from an employee."
From these relationships the court found a duty on the part of
the oil company to refrain from negligent conduct which reasona-
bly and foreseeably could have caused injury to the fisherman's
business. The court concluded that the defendant breached his
duty and that the fisherman incurred reasonably foreseeable dam-
ages which were recoverable. 7
While allowing recovery for a purely economic loss, the Oppen
court did limit the effect of its decision to the specific facts of the
case: "[lit must be understood that our holding in this case does
not open the door to claims that may be asserted by those, other
than commercial fishermen."" The court also noted that it had
previously refused to apply Robins in a proceeding where a fisher-
man had suffered economic loss unaccompanied by physical
83. Id. at § 130, at 952. See 501 F.2d at 565.
84. 501 F.2d at 566. Some of those held liable include "pension consultants, accountants,
architects, attorneys, notaries public, test hold drillers, title abstractors, termite inspectors,
soil engineers, surveyors, real estate brokers, drawers of checks, directors of corporations,
trustees, bailees and public weighers." Id. For a list of cases involving these professions,
businesses, and trades see id. at 566 n.9.
85. Id. at 570-71.
86. Id. at 567 (quoting Carbone v. Ursich, the Del Rio, 209 F.2d 178, 182 (9th Cir. 1953)).
87. Id. at 568. In addition, the Ninth Circuit also examined the work of Guido Calabresi
in G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF AccIDENTs (1970), and came to the conclusion that the defen-
dant oil company was the best and cheapest cost avoider-the entity best situated to pre-
vent the problem of oil pollution in this case. 501 F.2d at 569-70.
88. Id. at 570.
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injury."9
Other courts, however, have not been reluctant to extend recov-
ery for economic losses to various other situations.90 Two examples
of the extension of this principle are In re Canal Barge Co.91 and
Chicago & W.LR.R. v. Buko Maru,92 in which railroads suffered
delay damages as a result of a maritime collision.
In In re Canal Barge Co., a towboat collided with a bridge which
was leased to and operated by the Terminal Railroad Association
of St. Louis (Terminal). As a result of the collision, Terminal was
forced to discontinue rail traffic over the bridge, resulting in a loss
of revenues and an increase in expenses." Despite the fact that
Terminal did not own the bridge, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi allowed Terminal to re-
cover its damages in admiralty, as well as the expenses of its cus-
tomer railroads.H
In Chicago & W.I.R.R. v. Buko Maru, the tenant railroads sued
for damages caused when a bridge which the railroads had con-
tracted to use was damaged by the defendant's vessel. A federal
district court in Illinois noted that there was no reason to deny
plaintiffs' recovery merely because they did not own the bridge;
there was a contractual right to use the bridge pursuant to federal
law.9 5 The court also found that the interruption of the plaintiff's
business was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negli-
gence. More important, the court concluded that its decision did
not conflict with Robins because that decision relied heavily on the
fact that the defendant did not know of the charter agreement un-
til after the damage occurred."
Commentators have also advanced the notion that economic
losses should be allowed. As Professor Prosser has noted, "No very
satisfactory reason has been given for this refusal of a remedy in
89. Id. at 567 (citing Carbone, 209 F.2d 178).
90. See, e.g., General Foods-Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 111, 114 (D.Md. 1978);
Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 392 F. Supp. 908, 912-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 129, at 940; James, supra note 10, at 55-58;
88 HARV. L. REV. 444, 450-53 (1974).
91. 323 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1971), affd, 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on re-
hearing, 513 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975).
92. 1974 A.M.C. 2287 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
93. 323 F. Supp. at 808, 815.
94. Id. at 818, 823.
95. 1974 A.M.C. at 2288.
96. Id. at 2289. The question the court seemed to find emerging from Robins was
whether the claimant possessed a legally protected interest that had been damaged. See id.
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negligence cases." 97 Professor James, agreeing with Prosser's basic
conclusion, urges that there is no reason to deny the recovery of
damages for a limited number of plaintiffs. 98 Thus, there appears
to be support from cases and commentators upon which courts can
rely in order to grant the recovery of purely economic losses. The
sole remaining question is whether the supporting arguments can
be adapted to allow for the recovery of delay damages.
IV. THE WELL-PLEAD COMPLAINT
The continuing vitality of decisions which deny recovery to per-
sons seeking delay damages creates a precarious situation for an
attorney who represents such a claimant. Some direction can, how-
ever, be provided by the group of cases allowing recovery which
may increase the possibility of receiving these economic losses in
an admiralty proceeding. The initial step in obtaining a favorable
judgment is the drafting of a complaint which conforms with one
of the successful cases; thus the call for a "well-plead complaint."
In developing the complaint, attention should be paid to the dis-
tinguishing elements between the two divergent groups of cases:
the cause of action, the vocabulary, and the scope of liability.
Many successful actions have been based upon either a tradi-
tional action for negligence or an action in public nuisance. Causes
of action which claim a negligent interference with a contract have
traditionally been dismissed by the courts. When pleading a cause
of action in negligence, the emphasis should be on the notions of
duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages, thereby keep-
ing the argument in its simplest form. This analysis was employed
by the court in Kinsman after it concluded that the doctrine of
negligent interference with a contract was inapplicable." There is
one caveat when employing the Kinsman analysis: the damages
must be plead so they are not deemed to be too remote or
tenuous. 1o
Another theory that will enhance the chances of recovery is an
action in public nuisance. This theory may be preferable to the
traditional negligence action because it avoids the use of the word
"negligence," thus making it difficult for the court to construe the
case as involving the negligent interference of a contract. The Lyra
97. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 129, at 940.
98. James, supra note 10, at 55-56.
99. 388 F.2d at 824.
100. Id. at 824, 825.
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and Piscataqua decisions are examples of how effective this argu-
ment can be.101
In addition, the practitioner's choice of vocabulary appears to be
as important as the cause of action. Avoiding the use of the word
"negligence," especially in a context which might allow the action
to be related to the negligent interference of a contract, will dimin-
ish the possibility of the court employing the non-recovery ratio-
nale of Robins. The request for damages should also be worded
carefully. If damages are plead in a manner similar to Robins, then
a similar result may be expected-no recovery for the losses.
An attorney should also be cognizant that many courts have de-
nied recovery of purely economic losses when such recovery would
expose the defendant to unlimited liability.10 2 Therefore, the num-
ber of plaintiffs claiming damages in the action should be kept to a
minimum. Most of the cases which allowed recovery involved a
limited number of plaintiffs who could recover because of the de-
fendant's negligence. 103 Thus, by reducing the number of potential
plaintiffs the court is prevented from using the unlimited liability
argument to the detriment of a client.
The abovementioned suggestions demonstrate the problems
which confront an attorney because of the continued existence of
the Robins rule of non-recovery. Although some courts have al-
lowed recovery of economic losses, and commentators have called
for the demise of the Robins rule, the Fifth Circuit has been persis-
tent in its refusal to allow any claim which appears to fit into the
101. Lyra, 360 F. Supp. 1188; Piscatagua, 89 F. 362. See 88 HARV. L. REV., supra note
90, at 451:
A more effective approach is . . . the . . . nuisance doctrine. Since a public nui-
sance usually implicates the interests of many persons, a rule permitting each
damaged individual to recover for his injuries would frequently impose a tremen-
dous burden on the tortfeasor and create excessive litigation for the courts. How-
ever, by requiring each plaintiff to show that his injury is different in kind from
those of the public generally, courts have limited the scope of liability to accept-
able dimensions.
(Footnotes omitted).
102. James, supra note 10, at 47-48.
103. See, e.g., Micmar Motorship Corp. v. Cabaneli Naviera, S.A., 477 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.
La. 1979); In re Lyra Shipping Co., 360 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. La. 1973); Chicago & W.I.R.R.
v. Buko Maru, 1974 A.M.C. 2287 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805
(N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d 11 (1973), afl'd on rehearing, 513 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); The Jamaica, 51 F.2d 858 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); Piscataqua
Nay. Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 89 F. 362 (D. Mass. 1898), modified, 108 F. 92 (1st
Cir. 1901). See also General Foods Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. at 116 (D. Md.
1978), where the court, in distinguishing China Union Lines and Lyra, noted that neither
case imposed far-reaching liability.
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Robins rationale.' "
There is a possibility that the standard for recovery of economic
loss due to delay will be relaxed and the need to play this game of
"hide and seek" in many courts will be eliminated in the future. As
stated by one commentator, "Admittedly there is a point beyond
which liability should not be carried, but that point is located best
by a balancing of social interests, not by a flat rule of nonliabil-
ity." 105 A change in the law is beginning to evolve which is evi-
denced by the number of exceptions that already exist to the rule
of nonliability.'"
The Second Circuit in Kinsman, while denying recovery, ex-
pressed a strong disapproval of the Robins rationale when it
stated:
[W]e hesitate to accept the "negligent interference with contract"
doctrine in the absence of satisfactory reasons for differentiating
contractual rights from other interests which the law protects.
The argument [is] frequently heard, that to allow recovery in
such instances would impose a penalty far out of proportion to
the defendant's fault or open the field to collusive claims and in-
creased litigation .... Here, as elsewhere, the answer must be
that courts have some expertise in performing their almost daily
task of distinguishing the honest from the collusive or fraudulent
claim. And, "[i]f the result is out of all proportion to the defen-
dant's fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff's
entire innocence." . . Moreover, several cases often cited as il-
lustrations of the application of the "negligent interference with
contract" doctrine have been convincingly explained in terms of
other, more common tort principles .... Indeed, Professors
Harper and James suggest that the application of the doctrine is
wholly artificial in most instances.107
The argument that the defendants will be exposed to unlimited
liability is a concern of the courts in any action for the recovery of
104. See Dick Meyers, 577 F.2d at 1024, 1025 n.4. The Fifth Circuit did note, however,
that:
[t]he law has traditionally been reluctant to recognize claims based solely on harm
to the interest in contractual relations or business expectancy .... While the
wisdom of that traditional reluctance is open to debate, the rule ... is too well-
settled to be overturned by a panel of this court.
Id. at 1025 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
105. Note, supra note 12, at 681, 693-94. See, e.g., James, supra note 10, at 55-58; 88
HARV. L. RE v., supra note 90, at 450-53.
106. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
107. 388 F.2d at 823-24 (citations omitted).
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pure economic loss. This concern should be diminished in admi-
ralty actions since Congress has provided that vessel owners can
limit their liability to the value of the vessel.105 This appears to be
a persuasive factor for allowing recovery of pure economic loss in
admiralty before allowing it in other areas.
Throughout the cases discussed, many courts seemed to prefer a
traditional test for negligence or public nuisance, rather than the
strict rule of nonliability laid out in Robins.109 In fact, the court in
Buko Maru concluded that a decision which had relied on Robins
was unsound "in view of the rather dramatic advances in tort lia-
bility which have occurred since Justice [Holmes] found no liabil-
ity for the negligent interference with unforeseen contractual rela-
tionships."110 Thus, as the trend continues and more exceptions to
the rule of nonliability arise, the impact of Robins should continue
to weaken until the admiralty courts resort to a case-by-case analy-
sis of suits for delay damages.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the two divergent groups of cases, obvious obstacles
confront the practitioner. Yet, the decisions of China Union Lines,
Lyra, and other cases allowing recovery demonstrate that these ob-
stacles are not insurmountable. These decisions must be examined
in light of the Robins rule of nonliability, which is still followed by
many courts. For this reason, the need for artful pleading has de-
veloped-the practitioner must strive to remove his or her case
from the context of Robins and place it in "safe harbor" by the use
of arguments from cases which have allowed recovery. The cases
which are contrary to Robins exemplify the unwillingness of the
courts to allow a rule of nonliability to endure when it deserves
little merit. There still remains, however, the precedent for refus-
ing delay damages, and until the Supreme Court limits the scope
of Robins, word games will have to continue if a shipper is to be
rightfully compensated for a very real and undeserved injury.
108. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976). See generally G. GiLMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 3, at
818-957.
109. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d at 824; Federal Commerce & Naviga-
tion Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 392 F. Supp. at 913; In re China Union Lines, Ltd., 285 F.
Supp. at 427.
110. 1974 A.M.C. at 2289-90.
